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After the centrally-planned economy ceased to exist, the process of post-socialist 
transformations has advanced significantly. The countries of the Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), Southern and Eastern Europe (SEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) have been involved since in vast systematic changes. Undoubtedly, these changes 
have been leading to fully-fledged market economies, although the precise outcome of 
transformation was not going to be the same for all the countries involved. 
The main objective of the restructuring of the banking systems was to create some modern 
such systems, according to the international standards, which could directly support the 
development and the stability of the economies. This objective could be achieved by tight 
efforts of both the central banks and commercial banks. In the current economic 
environment, where the most important goal is globalization and openness to the 
international trends, where the competition becomes sounder every day and the rise in the 
quality is necessary, the firms face an important need for capital and for short-term and long-
term funds, and the role of the banks in supporting this development and in ensuring and 
sustaining the macroeconomic balance becomes crucial.  
The paper investigates the role of the monetary policy in the area of the banking credits of 
the commercial banks, in the savings area and in the investments area and their implications 
on the macroeconomic balance (current account balance, budget balance and private 
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balance). The analysis is based more on the Romanian case as compared to the other 
countries in the Central and Eastern European region.     
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1. Introduction 
After the centrally-planned economy ceased to exist, the process of post-socialist 
transformations has advanced significantly. 27 countries in the Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), Southern and Eastern Europe (SEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) have been involved since in vast systematic changes. Undoubtedly, these changes 
have been leading to fully-fledged market economies, although the precise outcome of 
transformation was not going to be the same for all the countries involved. In fact, some 
leaders of the CEE region joined the EU in 2004 while others, especially countries of the CIS 
region, were lagging behind in systematic changes and maintaining a hybrid system with 
remnants of the central planning existing alongside elements of market regulation and a 
growing private sector. 
The financial sector is the backbone of every market economy. An important and in some 
countries even a dominant role is played by the banks. A stable and efficient banking sector 
is therefore an essential precondition for both to increase the economic level and to secure a 
smooth path of the integration process crowned by the adoption of the euro. Over the 
several past years, banking has changed significantly, due to irreversible processes such as 
liberalization, globalization, privatization, mergers and acquisition or the implementation of 
modern information technologies. However, the transformation of the savings of the banks’ 
customers into loans and credits financing consumption and investment can be still 
considered as a core of the banking business and the foundation of the banks’ existence.  
The role of the banks is essential for the development of the economy. The development of 
the firms is a strategic factor of the economic growth, due to the large number of jobs and 
value-added they create in all the regions.  
Thus, the banking systems started to participate and support such a dynamics, because the 
settlement, firstly, and the development of the new enterprises afterwards always should be 
financially supported. In the current economic environment, when the main target is the 
globalization and a larger openness to the international tendencies, where the competition 
becomes tougher and sounder and the rise in the quality becomes a necessity, the 
enterprises face a sharper need of capital and both short-term and long-term liquidities.  
We could also say that the credit institutions own a part of the financial levers of the 
economy, and by their policy they could support or break the development of the economic 
agents. The credit represents the main financing and investment source of the firms, 
especially in a country such as Romania, which is undergoing a period of transition to a 
stable and efficient market economy.  
The main objective of restructuring of the banking systems is to create a modern such 
system, according to the international standards, which could directly support the Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
development and the stability of the entire economy. This objective could be achieved by 
determined efforts of both the NBR and the commercial banks. 
The main objective of the entire transition period should have been the inflows of the foreign 
capital in the financial and banking area and the settlement and the development of the 
banking system according to the standards of the market economy, which could achieve an 
efficient and profitable banking activity, based on the volume of the liabilities and, especially 
on the possibilities of attracting the funds from the economy and from the people. Both the 
theory and the banking practice proved that the banks performances directly depended on 
the nature of the economic and social systems, the level of the country development and the 
economic policy that the states have implemented.  The market economy imposes the 
restructuring of the banking system according to the western banking standards and thus, 
the banking system can support the settlement of a new type of economy and the re-launch 
of the economic growth. 
However, the changes in these economies have influenced the macroeconomic balances, 
significantly raising doubts about their sustainability and concerns over the potential impacts 
that a rapid and disordered correction of these imbalances might have had. On the one 
hand, these imbalances reflect the success of the structural changes that have enabled 
capital and investment inflows and have opened up prospects of fast economic growth. On 
the another hand, from another perspective, the imbalances frequently reflect the 
mismanaged transition processes featuring unsustainable imbalances that are potentially a 
source of value or currency and/or balance of payments crises (the Czech Republic (1997), 
the Russian Federation (1998)). In fact, the general view is that postponing the imbalances 
adjustments (especially the external ones that were the largest and lasting ones) it increases 
the costs of adjustment in the economy. However, given that the financial markets in the 
transition countries are gradually operating efficiently, the deterioration of the external 
balances might offer investment opportunities in the region as compared to the rest of the 
world. Indeed, a growing external deficit might be a sign of the gradual growth in the 
economic strength of the transition economies, and is thus not necessarily a bad thing.  
2. The monetary and banking factors play the most 
important role in the economic strategies in the 
contemporary market economy 
In the last three decades, some major changes in the world economy occurred, and their 
consequences were only partly assimilated by the economic theory, which mainly remained 
faithful to some economic ideas that did not fit any more to the current situation. 
The banks can influence the economic processes using different mechanisms and mainly 
the one of the credit and the interest rate: the real economy can be re-oriented using the 
exchange rate and the interest rate, and these are even more efficient and lasting than the 
state plans in the centralized economies. 
The main instrument used by the commercial banks to influence the economic development 
is the banking credit. The volume of the credits in the economy is influenced by the active 
interest rate that depends on the economic state, the inflation rate, the risk, the credit 
demand and supply and, firstly, on the monetary policy implemented by the National Bank of  The Impact of the National Bank of Romania‘s Monetary Policy 
 
 




Romania (NBR), which uses the minimum reserves ratio and the discount rate to influence 
the banking credits. 
a) The minimum reserves ratio was the main factor that maintained such high interest 
rates for credits. 
The NBR’s interventions in the monetary market have a greater influence over the interest 
rates, even larger than the discount rate.  
Figure 1 
The credit interest rates, the minimum reserves ratio and the interest rates for 












































Credit interest rate of the commercial banks (%)
The minimum reserves ratio in ROL (%)
The interest rate of the minimum reserves in ROL (%)
 
Source: Author’s computations  using the statistical data from the NBR’s Annual Reports and 
Monthly Bulletins.   
Using this monetary instrument in order to maintain certain high interest rates for the 
deposits leads to the following effects: 
•  The credit supply of the commercial banks diminishes, so that some resources are 
withdrawn from the economic circuit (and kept in reserves) and are not used in the 
economy; 
•  It causes a rise in the interest rate in the economy. Its effects are: 
−  The banks offer a interest rate for the deposits, which can be covered by the 
interest rate obtained for the credits. Unfortunately, not all the resources are used 
for granting the credits, so that the credits should ensure the same interest for the 
banks as if all the resources are used for credits. 
−  When the central bank rises the minimum reserves ratio (as it happened in 
Romania in 1997-2001), the commercial banks have to intervene on the monetary 
market by rising the money demand in order to obtain the liquidity needed for 
covering the new larger volume of the reserves. As long as the money demand 
rises and the supply remains lower than the demand, there will be a strong 
pressure for rising the interest rates on that market. This larger interest rate should 
be covered by rising the credit interest rate. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
In our country, the rate for such deposits was rather high and sometimes very high. For 
instance, in the second half of 1999 it exceeded 20% and in 2000 and the first half of 2001 it 
has even reached a level of 30%.  
Thus, in some periods the third part of the banking resources were kept in the accounts at 
the central bank as the minimum reserves and they could not be used for crediting and 
financing the national economy that faced a sharp need of funds. That led to an unjustified 
rise in the active interest rates of the commercial banks. 
This way, the access to the credits was limited for the economic agents and for those who 
still afforded to borrow from banks this has led to the rise in that financing cost and 
diminished their profits and, why not, cut the budgetary incomes and made the budget deficit 
even larger because the profit taxes kept dropping as a result of diminishing the taxing 
profits. 
Because of the great monetary liquidity excess in the economy as a result of some 
inadequate NBR monetary policies, starting from April 1999 the amount of the minimum 
reserves was determined daily, then, since July 16
th 1999, the minimum reserves ratio rose 
from 15% to 20%. These minimum reserves served a double objective: the monetary policy 
and one of banking prudence.  
In 2000, the NBR performed a partial sterilization of the excess of domestic currency on the 
market and that led to some significant positive differences between the average value of the 
effective reserves in the current account and the established level of the minimum reserves 
(the peak was reached in December), as well as some high level of the gaps between the 
daily average of the effective banks reserves into the NBR accounts and their established 
level. Still, the NBR managed to maintain a low gap in order to fulfill the objective of targeting 
the monetary base as the program agreed by the IMF stated.    
In 2001, as a result of the permanent collaboration and dialogue between the Romanian 
Banks Association (ARE) and the NBR, the latter has finally understood that the minimum 
reserves ratio had to be reduced for achieving a larger access of the small and medium 
sized enterprises to credits. Thus, the minimum reserves ratio was reduced in 2001 from 
30% to 27% in July and, finally, to 25% in the last quarter of the year. The descendent trend 
also continued in 2002, when the ratio dropped to 22% in April. 
The ascendant trend of the minimum reserves ratio in the last decade improved the banks’ 
liquidity, but has also affected badly the banking performances and the support of the activity 
of the economic agents by credits.  
The NBR used this monetary instrument especially over the interval 1999-2001, when it 
raised the minimum reserves ratio both for the deposits denominated in domestic currency 
and for the ones denominated in foreign currency, in order to ensure a tight control of the 
inter-banking liquidity and to ensure additional funds attracted at some low interest rates. 
The peak of the minimum reserves ratio of 30% was maintained longer than a year and a 
half and it dropped only in the second half of 2001.   
For having a complete image regarding the NBR financial effort of sterilization of the inter-
banking liquidity after the reduction in the minimum reserves ratio from 30% to 27% in 2001, 
we have to mention here that the amounts resulted from this measure were large. Thus, 
those amounts should have been absorbed from the market using the open-market  The Impact of the National Bank of Romania‘s Monetary Policy 
 
 




operations that were realized at the market interest rate and not at the interest rate offered 
by the NBR for the minimum reserves, as it often happened before that moment. 
Analyzing the data in Table 1, one may notice that making up the minimum reserves was not 
the best choice for the banking profitability. Still, if we consider the need of banking liquidity, 
this compulsory placement was extremely necessary, because it was the most liquid asset of 
the banks. Moreover, although nobody would have liked to use this “concession” because of 
the image impact resulted from this, not fulfilling the minimum reserves level in a period 
would have been transferred in the following period of applying the minimum reserves.  
We can conclude that the level of the minimum reserves both in ROL and foreign currency is 
extremely important for the evolution of the financial and banking market, because it 
influences the following elements: 
•  the banking strategy for attracting and placing the short-term and long-term resources;  
•  the support of the economy by credits; 
•  the access to the credits granted with low interest rates; 
•  the profitability level of the banks, because the minimum reserves grant low interest 
rates for the banks. 
The higher the minimum reserves ratio is the greater the liquidity is for the banks. Still, there 
are some malfunctions that cannot be ignored. There were some cases when the banks 
went bankrupt even when they presented an adequate liquidity. That means that only the 
minimum reserves themselves cannot ensure the well-functioning of a bank that has not a 
proper management. At least, the signal of not fulfilling the NBR requests can limit the 
negative effects that can spread around in the entire banking system, in the case that one 
bank may face a liquidity crisis.     
Given this situation, modifying the minimum reserves ratio strongly influenced the credit 
interest rates of the commercial banks, as one may see from Table 1 below. 
We also have to emphasize the low level of the interest rates of the minimum reserves, 
much lower than the market interest rate average. For example, in Romania the NBR offered 
for the minimum reserves an interest rate of almost 20% of the credit interest rate of the 
commercial banks in 1997-1999, but this interest rate rose in 2000 and 2001 to almost 40-
50% (apparently because of the IMF pressures). It becomes obvious that this low level of the 
interest rates of the minimum reserves that was totally insufficient for covering the deposit 







The minimum reserves ratio and the interest rates for the banking 
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The interest rates for the banking 
minimum reserves 
(% per year) 
The minimum reserves 
ratio (%)  Period 
ROL USD EUR  RON  Foreign 
currencies 
2000  Jan. 
          Feb. 
          Mar. 
          Apr. 
          May 
          Jun. 
          Jul. 
          Aug. 
          Sep. 
          Oct. 
          Nov. 
          Dec. 
2001  Jan. 
          Feb. 
          Mar. 
          Apr. 
          May 
          Jun. 
          Jul. 
          Aug. 
          Sep. 
          Oct. 
          Nov. 
          Dec. 
2002  Jan. 
          Feb. 
          Mar. 
          Apr. 
          May 
          Jun. 
          Jul. 
          Aug. 
          Sep. 
          Oct. 
          Nov. 
          Dec. 
2003  Jan. 
          Feb. 
          Mar. 
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The interest rates for the banking 
minimum reserves 
(% per year) 
The minimum reserves 
ratio (%)  Period 
ROL USD EUR  RON  Foreign 
currencies 
          May 
          Jun. 
          Jul. 
          Aug. 
          Sep. 
          Oct. 
          Nov. 
          Dec. 
2004  Jan. 
          Feb. 
          Mar. 
          Apr. 
          May 
          Jun. 
          Jul. 
          Aug. 
          Sep. 
          Oct. 
          Nov. 
          Dec. 
2005  Jan. 
          Feb. 
          Mar. 
          Apr. 
          May 
          Jun. 
          Jul. 
          Aug. 
          Sep. 
          Oct. 




























































































































































Source: Author’s computations using the statistical data from the NBR Annual Reports 
and Monthly Bulletins.  
b) The discount rate: In our country, the discount rate was much higher than in the other 
former socialist countries over the entire last decade. The evolution of the discount rate of 
the several central banks in the Central and Eastern Europe is presented in the figure below 
and stresses significant differences to the detriment of our country (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
The discount rate evolution in Romania and some other countries of the 










1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Romania Poland Hungary Czech Republic
          
Source: Author’s computations using the statistical data from Cestat Statistical Bulletin, 
2002. 
       
In Romania, the discount rate was almost three times higher than the one in the Czech 
Republic, twice as much as the one in Hungary, four times higher than in Slovenia and five 
times higher than in Slovakia. 
The conclusion is simple: the central banks of the analyzed countries considered a high 
discount rate as an abnormal situation that had to be avoided or they gave up on it after a 
few years. For the NBR this abnormal situation became permanent and caused the rise and 
preservation of high interest rates on the Romanian market for a long time.  
3. The significant drop of the credit market and of the 
real economy. Some international comparisons 
regarding the share of the banking credit in the GDP 
  
In the countries that face a normal evolution of their economies the credits usually rise and their 
structure display a significant share of the credits for the non-banking sector, especially for the 
economic agents for financing their investments and for the well-functioning of the enterprises. 
It is obvious that the situation is different for each country and for every economic agent, 
according to the capitalization level of the national economy and of every economic agent, but 
the above mentioned trend is real (Table 2). 
Table 2 
 The evolution of the banking credit share of GDP in Romania and other 
countries  The Impact of the National Bank of Romania‘s Monetary Policy 
 
 




The total credit share of the GDP, % 
Other countries in transition  Developed countries 
Year 
Romania 
Poland Hungary  Czech 
Republic 
USA France United 
Kingdom 
Canada
1993 21  41  97  72  76  102  114  91 
1994 18  39  93  72  75  101  116  91 
1995 24  34  82  72  77  102  122  90 
1996 29  36  72  70  77  102  126  93 
1997 19  37  65  73  78  102  125  94 
1998 22  37  63  66  81  101  122  92 
1999 18  40  52  63  83  105  125  89 
2000 14  36  48  57  86  103  134  86 
2001 12  40  50  57  89  117  140  88 
2002 13  38  53  56  91  118  145  90 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, June 2003. 
 
According to the data presented in the above table and figure, there are some important 
differences between our country and the other analyzed countries, that are partly due to the 
evolution of the real GDP, which is also in the detriment of our country.  
The drop in the credit share of the GDP to levels of 20-25% and even lower represents, no 
doubt, the neglecting of the credit as the main instrument in order to influence the economy 
and to stimulate the economic growth. 
4. The saving process and the investment process and 
their impact on  the current account imbalances in 
the transition countries   
 
The large and lasting current account deficits in the Central and Eastern European Countries 
in the transition period caused the imbalance of the savings and investments ratio (the drop 
in the savings volume and the rise in the investments). 
The lasting deficits generate borrowings from abroad that are more dangerous for the 
economy if they are oriented towards consumption and not towards investments. A high 
investments rate leads to a rise in the productive capacity and to a rise in the export in the 
future, which will make the burden of the external debt more bearable. 
A deficit that is generated by the drop in the savings is less sustainable than the one caused 
by the rise in the investments (and that is the case of Romania). Moreover, the investments 
in the private productive sector, in the merchandises sector, will make the deficits more 
sustainable (unlike the borrowings directed to the real estate investments).  
The current account deficit is sustainable if the economic growth rate is high, because it 
leads to the rise in the investments, while the expected profits rise, too, and to the temporary 
drop in the private savings, because the domestic consumption is stimulated. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
The current account imbalance based on the drop in the national saving ratio can be 
generated either by the diminution of the private savings or by the diminution of the public 
ones (large public deficits). A fall in the national savings caused by a lower public saving is 
potentially more dangerous than a fall in the private savings, because a fall in the private 
savings is more likely to be a transitory phenomenon, while the structural public sector 
deficits are often long-lasting and may result in an unsustainable increase in the foreign 
debt. The temporary drop in the private savings can be due to the rise in the expectations 
regarding the GDP growth, which will lead to a permanent higher income and the rise in the 
consumption.  
All the CEE countries faced a serious drop in the real GDP in the first period of transition. 
The higher drop was observed over the interval 1991-1992 (more than a share of 10% of 
GDP per year). 
Romania had smaller imbalances (averaging 3-4% of GDP), but has shown persistent and 
structural deficits since 1990 and had experienced an economic crisis similar to that of 
Bulgaria, only that it had managed it better. 
In most of the countries (Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary), the collapse of output in the early 
1990’s led to significant current account deficits as the national saving rates dropped more 
drastically than the investment rates. The collapse of GDP was exacerbated by the serious 
external shocks that hit the transition economies: a worsening of their terms of trade as they 
moved to the world prices and the collapse of the trade within the CEMA region. Such 
external shocks led to a sharp reduction in the exports and a deterioration of the current 
account.  
GDP growth resumed in 1992 in Poland, in 1993 in Romania, in 1994 in Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Croatia, Bulgaria, but the return to positive growth (in 2000 in Romania) has been 
generally associated with a significant worsening of the current account over the following 
years for most of these countries. The higher economic growth rate was the larger 
imbalance of the current account and the commercial balance happened (the Czech 
Republic, the Slovak Republic, Estonia, and Croatia). In the countries where the economic 
growth was slower the external imbalances were smaller or the current account situation 
even improved in some cases (Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania).   
In general, the worsening of the current account has been caused by a sharp recovery of the 
national investment rates, driven by the return to positive growth. National saving rates have 
generally grown, but more slowly than the national investment rates or they have remained 
stagnant, especially due to the resumption of growth that has led to an increase in 
consumption rates (Bulgaria, Romania). At some extent, the low level of the savings was 
due to the large budgetary deficits in almost every country in the region. The data suggest 
that most of the improvement after 1993 was due to an increase in the national savings rate. 
While the private savings as a share of GDP have remained stable, an improvement in 
public savings has occurred. However, in Romania the savings rates were very low, due to 
the negative real interest rates that stimulated consumption and due to the high inflation 
rates.  
In some countries in the region, the widening of the public deficits seemed to happened at 
the same time with the widening of the current account deficits. In Romania and Bulgaria, 
the data regarding the savings are not complete for comparisons or it is difficult to analyze 
them because of the frequent changes of the inflation rate in the last decade (the low  The Impact of the National Bank of Romania‘s Monetary Policy 
 
 




savings level was also due to the sudden and frequent changes of the fiscal policy). In the 
last decade, the low rate of savings and investments generated serious problems for the 
Romanian current account. Thus, the current account deficits were structural in the case of 
Romania.   
The overview of the current account balance in transition countries shows that, with the 
exception of Russian Federation – a major commodity exporter, the opening up to external 
trade has been accompanied by significant current account deficits (see Table 3). In the 
CEE, the current account balances were not problematic, with even a moderate positive 
balance as a share of GDP until 1994 (averaging around 1 percent of GDP), reflecting 
contractions in the domestic demand, real exchange rate under-valuations and external 
financing constraints. Afterwards, significant current account deficit deterioration was noticed 
in the region, peaking at almost 7 percent of GDP in 1998 on average (Lithuania (11.7), 
Latvia (10.7) and Slovakia (9.6)), mostly as a result of growing imports of both consumption 
and investment goods. Moreover, the gradual growth of the current account deficit in the 
CEE region reflects a combination of long-term growth and structural factors, external 
shocks and domestic policies. More precisely, the deterioration of the current accounts in the 
region was the result of the growth of merchandise trade deficits, downward trends in the 
service balance, rising indebtedness and profit repatriation, as well as the consequence of 
the continuous real appreciation of the domestic currency in most of the cases examined. 
Table 3 
 Saving/investment imbalances in the transition countries  
(in percentage of GDP; un-weighted averages) 





































1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Czech R.  -3.9  -1.4 -2.7 0.5 -3.4 -1.5 -3.4 -4.8  -4.2
Estonia -4.3  -7.8 -6.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -4.4 -8.2  -6.3
Hungary -1.8  -2.3 -2 -3.5 -5.4 -4.5 -5.3 -7.7  -6.5
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Latvia 5.5  -6.8 -0.7 -1.0 -2.2 -1.6 4.5 -9.0  -2.3
Lithuania -2.7  -3.9 -3.4 -4.1 -3.6 -3.8 -6.8 -7.5  -7.2
Poland 0.5  -0.8 -0.2 -2.9 -3.4 -3.1 -2.4 -4.2  -3.3
Slovakia 0.6  -2 -0.8 -4.1 -4.0 -4.0 -3.5 -6.0  -4.8
Slovenia 2.0  0.6 1.3 0.2 -1.4 -0.6 2.2 -0.8  0.7
CEE   0.0  -3.0 -1.5 -1.8 -3.0 -2.4 -1.8 -6.0  -3.9
Albania -9.2  2.8 -3.2 -14.4 -8.9 -11.6 -23.6 -6.1  -14.8
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
-19 -11 -14 -1.7 -4.1 -3.3 -20.7 -15.1  -17.3
Bulgaria 6.2  -4.9 0.6 -6.9 -0.4 -3.6 -0.7 -5.3  -3.0
Croatia -2.4  -0.8 -1.7 -1.6 -5.2 -3.4 -4.0 -6.0  -5.1
FYROM 0.8  -3 -1.1 -4.8 -2.4 -3.6 -4.0 -5.4  -4.7Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
Romania -2.0  -1.3 -1.6 -3.4 -3.5 -3.5 -5.4 -4.8  -5.1
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
n. a.  -4.4 -4.8 n. a. -2.6 -2.6 -8.0 -7.0  -7.4
SEE -3.9  -3.2 -3.6 -5.9 -3.9 -4.9 -9.8 -7.1  -8.5
Armenia 1.4  -8.9 -3.6 -18.1 -4.0 -11.0 -16.7 -12.9  -14.6
Azerbaidjan -13.8  -12.9 -12.9 -6.0 -1.9 -3.9 -19.8 -14.8  -16.8
Belarus -3.8  -2.1 -2.8 -3.2 -1.4 -2.3 -7.0 -3.5  -5.1
Georgia -7.4  -3.6 -5.6 -13.1 -3.8 -8.4 -20.5 -7.4  -14.0
Kazakhstan -4.3  -0.2 -2.2 -4.9 -1.6 -3.3 -9.2 -1.8  -5.5
Kyrgyz R.  -4.3  -0.2 -1.7 -9.3 -8.0 -8.7 -13.6 -8.2  -10.4
Moldova 1.0  -8.2 -3.7 -10.2 -1.1 -5.6 -9.2 -9.3  -9.3
Russia 10.2  9.1 9.7 -7.4 0.6 -3.4 2.8 9.7  6.3
Tajikistan -3.5  -4.1 -3.3 -11.8 -1.1 -6.5 -15.3 -5.2  -9.8
Turkmenistan 13.5  -6 3.8 -3.1 -0.9 -2.0 10.4 -6.9 1.8
Ukraine 8.3  4.5 7 -11.2 -0.5 -5.8 -2.9 4.0  1.2
Uzbekistan 4.0  2.3 3.3 -7.6 -1.4 -4.5 -3.6 0.9  -1.2
CIS 1.3  -2.5 -0.6 -8.8 -2.1 -5.5 -7.5 -4.6  -6.1
All transition 
countries 
-0.9 -2.9 -1.9 -5.5 -3.0 -4.3 -6.4 -5.9 -6.2
Sources: WDI (2004), EIU (2004), EBRD (2004), own calculations. 
 
Similar, but even more intensive current account deficit dynamics were noticed in the CIS 
region by achieving the top average current account deficit at a significantly higher level 
(13.7 percent of GDP) than the CEE region in 1998. The major contributors to such a huge 
deterioration in the current account balance were some countries in the region with current 
account deficits above 20 percent of GDP (Turkmenistan (37.4), Azerbaidjan (30.7), etc.). 
Several factors contributed to this development. First, many countries in the region 
experienced large losses in their terms of trade as prices for the energy imports from the 
former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) trading partners moved to market-
determined levels. Second, these countries ran high negative fiscal imbalances as the 
authorities tried to absorb the revenue and expenditure pressure associated with sharp falls 
in the national income and fiscal restructuring (see Table 3). Third, as a result of the slow 
progress in building a competitive and diversified export sector the trade liberalization mainly 
stimulated imports of consumer goods and services. As a response to the Russian crisis, the 
average current account deficits narrowed in the group. However, in many cases the deficits 
remained high – around or even above 10 percent of GDP (Azerbaidjan (15.9), Armenia 
(8.1), etc.) on average in the recent 2001-2003 period. On the other hand, the SEE region 
achieved the highest average current account deficit with around 20 percent of GDP in 1992 
due to the enormous deficit occurred in Albania (68.5 percent). Later, these huge external 
imbalances improved significantly. However, at the beginning of the second half of the 1990s 
and in the first years of the 21st century they deteriorated again. Eventually, the average 
current account deficit was 8.2 percent of GDP in 2001-2003 in comparison to the previous 
three years, when it averaged out at 5.9 percent of GDP (see Figure 3).    
Figure 3  The Impact of the National Bank of Romania‘s Monetary Policy 
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Sources: WDI (2004), EIU (2004), EBRD (2004), own calculations. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
5. Development of investment and saving rates in the 
transition countries 
At the start of the transition more than a decade ago the investment-to-GDP ratio in all the 
transition countries practically bottomed out in line with the drop in output (see Figure 4). 
Moreover, much of the capital stock at that time became obsolete overnight. Afterwards, 
investment rebounded, particularly in the CEE region (an average of some 28 percent of 
GDP in 1998), where the countries intensively struggled to transform their economies into 
market-oriented ones. Nevertheless, the rise in total investment in most of the transition 
countries during the 1990s was largely concentrated in the business sector. In fact, in most 
transition countries the average government capital expenditure was less than 5 percent of 
GDP over the period. However, as part of the process of real convergence, the investment 
ratio, also including public investment, may have to rise further to maintain strong economic 
growth.  
The various structural reforms being undertaken in the transition countries should lead to an 
increase in the marginal productivity of domestic investment. Consequently, the further 
reform of financial markets, particularly in the SEE and CIS regions, with respective 
investment rates of only around 13 and 18 percent of GDP in the 2001-2003 period, are 
needed to ensure efficient and productive capital allocation. Moreover, in order to spur 
growth potential and boost the capacity to service future debt repayments, in the transition 
countries external borrowing for investment purposes is preferred to borrowing for 
consumption purposes. In this respect, the capital inflows, in particular the FDI, have been 
crucial in supporting these countries’ stronger investment needs. In fact, for the transition 
countries it may be optimal to attract foreign savings and direct them to productive 
investment. The data suggest that CEE has been the most successful region, with its net 
FDI averaging out at almost 5 percent of GDP, whereas the CIS region attracted a net FDI of 
just above 4 percent of GDP on average over the period 1992-2003.
1 These figures are 
much higher than in the developed countries, especially in the EU-15, which averaged less 
than 3 percent of GDP in the same period. 
In most transition countries, during the pre-transition era the domestic saving rates were 
exceptionally high. At the end of the 1980s the average saving rates of CEE, SEE and CIS 
were 32.9, 30.7 and 28.8 percent of GDP, respectively. These figures were relatively high, 
especially given the EU-15 member states’ average saving rate of only some 20 percent of 
GDP in the same period.
2 However, saving rates within the transition economies differed 
widely, with Poland on top (42.7 percent) in 1989 and Tajikistan (12.5) and Kyrgyz Republic 
(13.1) at the bottom. Denizer and Wolf (2000) revealed three main factors which effected 
savings in the pre-transition era: first there were ‘planned’ savings for funding ‘centrally 
planned’ investment. Second, the lack of consumer goods exposed limits on consumption 
below the desired levels and consequently induced so-called ‘involuntary savings’. Third, 
                                                           
1 In the period 2000-2003 the economies most attractive to FDI in the CEE region were Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic with an average net FDI of 8.8 and 8.5 percent of GDP, respectively. In the CIS 
region, the biggest attractions are Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan with an average of 13.6 and 9.1 
percent of GDP, respectively, in the same period.       
2 The EU-15 average savings rate has remained stable at around 20 percent of GDP since then.    The Impact of the National Bank of Romania‘s Monetary Policy 
 
 




savings that were voluntary but driven by expectations of a systemic change, e.g. reflecting 
expectations of the greater availability of goods.  
With the start of the transition process, the drop in domestic saving rates was enormous. 
Schrooten and Stephan (2003) pointed out at least three important factors which should be 
taken into account: consumption constraint, the savings overhang inherited from the past, 
and the massive uncertainty at the beginning of the transition process (high inflation, high 
unemployment, GDP decline etc.). However, a relatively slow recovery has been noticed 
despite huge differences both between and within the group of transition countries. For 
example, saving rates in CEE have stabilized at around 20 percent of GDP (the highest in 
Czech Republic with around 26 percent, the lowest in Poland with around 15 percent) on 
average in recent years. 
Figure 4 
Average domestic savings and investment in transition countries, 
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Sources: WDI (2004), EIU (2004), EBRD (2004), own calculations. 
On the other hand, in spite of significant saving rates improvements in CIS since 1998 they 
have recently remained quite low, at around 17 percent of GDP (the highest in Russia with 
around 32 percent, the lowest in Moldova with even a negative savings rate of around 12 
percent).
1  
A decomposition of the external imbalance between savings and investment shows that the 
main determinant of growing current account deficits has been, in general, a remarkable 
increase in the average investment rate in CEE and a significant decline in the average 
saving rate in SEE and CIS in the 1992-2003 period.
2 Indeed, the trends presented above 
mainly suggest an inter-temporal approach to the current account, where transition countries 
(in particular CEE) use foreign savings to cushion their consumption in the face of unusually 
high investment needs. Moreover, consumption smoothing in the inter-temporal approach to 
the current account predicts a lower saving rate as private agents increase their 
consumption today based on expectations of a higher income in the future. In the case of 
transition countries, in particular in the latter stages of the transition process, the recent 
liberalization of financial markets and steadily improving access to credit by the domestic 
private sector might be confronted with a declining saving rate as uncertainty becomes 
reduced and liquidity constraints are eased.
3  
The dramatic drop of the domestic savings ratio caused the deterioration of the Romanian 
current account situation. The savings ratio kept on dropping in the first half of the last 
decade (from 30% in 1989 to 22,9% in 1992) due to the negative real interest rates in the 
following period and to the high inflation rate that stimulated the consumption. This ratio was 
stabilized at some low levels (14% in 1998, 13,4% in 1999, 15,2% in 2000, 17% in 2001 and 
19,7% in 2002).  
                                                           
1 Due to data deficiencies it is hard to estimate a reliable level of the saving rate for the SEE region. 
Nevertheless, according to the available data almost all economies in the region have relatively low or 
even negative saving rates.    
2 In fact, international comparisons (see MFR, 1996) suggest that low and falling saving rates make 
current account deficits less sustainable and potentially make the economy fragile. 
3 Rodrik (2000) estimated that a 1-percentage point increase in the private-credit-to-income ratio would 
lower the long-term private saving rate by 0.74 of a percentage point in five CEE economies.  The Impact of the National Bank of Romania‘s Monetary Policy 
 
 




Measured investment rates actually showed an increase. The rise of the investments was 
mostly based on the rapid accumulation of the stock during 1990-1992 when the output was 
low. After a period of declining of investments in the whole region, investments share of GDP 
rise significantly starting with 1997-1999, reaching 23% in 2002 due to the foreign 
investments inflows, relative macroeconomic stability and the liberalization of the capital 
flows that started in 1999. 
The prognosis for the investments ratio shows their improvement to 26% in 2006 and for the 
savings ratio a rise to 22% in 2006 is expected. 
The Romanian experience regarding the GDP evolution is quite different from the one of 
other countries in the region. The relaunch of the economic growth in 1993 was accopanied 
by the improvement of the current account situation. Although the current deficit remained 
large (the average represented 3,8% of GDP) during 1993-1996, still it was lower than an 
average of 7,5% of GDP during 1990-1992. That situation was based on the public savings 
that began to rise starting from 1992, although the private savings remained low. 
The sharp depreciation of the national currency in real terms in 1996 associated with a rapid 
rise of the inflation rate and with an important economic and political crisis. After the 
elections from 1996, when the reformists won, the current account situation improved, but its 
financing was mainly based on the foreign direct investments that have started to rise since 
then to present times.  
World wide the determinant factor of the investment process is represented by the saving 
process. But the savings level directly depends on some organizationing conditions that 
could stimulate it such us: the incomes level, the quality of the national currency, the level of 
the market interest rate, the stable economic environment, the tax system etc. These 
conditions were not accomplished in Romania in the last transition decade. Although in the 
last years the savings ratio faces an ascendent trend, it is still very low comparing not only to 
the developed countries, but to the other Central and Eastern European Countries as well. 
Figure 5 
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Source: Author’s computations using the statistical data from the NBR Annual Reports and 
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The drop in the savings was the main cause of the reduction of the investments in the 
Romanian economy. The participation of the Ministery of Finance in the market in order to 
attract the available funds in the economy by offering higher interest rates than the ones in 
the market didn’t support either the relaunch of the saving process oriented to the 
productives objectives, because those funds were not directed to some economic objectives 
and so, they didn’t brought profits.    
Given those conditions the NBR suffocated the economy by using high interest rates of the 
banking system and thus by cutting down the investments policy.  
The NBR’s Governor Mugur Isarescu stressed this situation at the beginning at 1999 when 
he emphasized that the dramatic drop of the domestic savings ratio from 30% in 1989 to 
almost 14% in 1998  was mostly due to the reduction of the enterprises saving process. 
Moreover, the numbers showed that the state-owned enterprises didn’t save at all and their 
unique function was to pay the wages. The Governor also said that because of the lack of 
the domestic savings and of the external financing, the public deficit could have been 
financed only using inflationary methods. And without the domestic savings there weren’t 
any investments resources.  
After such a long period when the savings decreased and badly affected the entire economy, 
the savings started to recover during 2003-2005 as a result of laxing the NBR’s monetary 
policy. So, finally, in 2003, the deposits (denominated in ROL) of the economic agents rose 
with 58,3% (39% in real terms) comparing to 2002 and the ones denominated in euro also 
rose but only with 6,8% (the deposits of the phisical persons rose, but the ones of the 
economic agents slowly decreased). In 2005, the domestic currency deposits of the 
economic agents rose with 63,9% comparing to 2004 (51,6% in real terms) and the foreign 
currency deposits also rose with 49,4% (thid time, the most important rise was attributed to 
the deposits of the economic agents – 81,5%). 
6. Conclusions 
In the first decade of transition, the NBR monetary policy based mostly on some very 
restrictive monetary instruments such as the high discount rate and high minimum reserves 
ratio. Their high levels comparing to the ones in the other transition countries maintained 
high interest rates in the entire banking system and that didn’t support the real economy by 
stimulating the domestic investments. Moreover, the high domestic interest rates didn’t 
manage to attract the foreign investments; they dropped too, after a boom at the beginning 
of ’90, because of the domestic political and economic conditions. In the present, the NBR 
reduced their levels and mainly uses less restrictive and more flexible, adequate instruments 
that don’t influence firstly the interest rates on the monetary market, but still manage to 
influence the banking credits (such as the open-market and reverse repo transactions).  
So, the Romanian monetary policy didn’t support the efforts of the economy for recovering. 
During almost the entire last decade, it was a tight policy oriented to target inflation and thus 
neglecting the other macroeconomic variables such as the savings (discouraged by the high 
and persistent inflation) and investments that would sustain the economic growth. This led to 
major imbalances at the macroeconomic level and they affected badly all the economic 
aspects. The largest and lasting imbalance was the external one.     The Impact of the National Bank of Romania‘s Monetary Policy 
 
 




The current account imbalance based on the drop of the national saving ratio can be 
generated either by the diminishing of the private savings or by the diminishing of the public 
ones (large public deficits). A fall in national savings caused by a lower public savings is 
potentially more dangerous than a fall in private savings, because a fall in private savings is 
more likely to be a transitory phenomenon while structural public sector deficits are often 
long-lasting and may result in an unsustainable increase of foreign debt.  
In general, the worsening of the current account has been caused by a sharp recovery of 
national investment rates driven by the return to positive growth. National saving rates have 
generally grown but more slowly than national investment rates or they have remained 
stagnant, especially due to the resumption of growth that has led to an increase in 
consumption rates (Bulgaria, Romania). At some extent, the low level of the savings was 
due to the large budgetary deficits in almost every country in the region. The data suggest 
that most of the improvement is due to an increase in national savings rate. While private 
savings as a share of GDP have remained stable, there has been a improvement in public 
savings. Still, in Romania, the savings rates were very low, due to the negative real interest 
rates that stimulated consumption and due to the high inflation rates.  
  In some countries in the region, the widening of the public deficits seemed to 
happened in the same time with the widening of the current account deficits. In Romania and 
Bulgaria, the data regarding the savings are not complete for comparisons or there is difficult 
to analyze them because of the often changes of the inflation rate in the last decade (the low 
savings level was also due to the sudden and frequent changes of the fiscal policy). In the 
last decade, the low rate of savings and investments generated serious problems for the 
Romanian current account. So, the current account deficits were structural in our country’s 
case.   
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